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Abstract
We present efficient approximation algorithms for
finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is,
games in which the players utilities, though different,
do not differentiate between other players. Our results
pertain to such games with many players but few strate-
gies. We show that any such game has an approximate
pure Nash equilibrium, computable in polynomial time,
with approximation O(s2λ), where s is the number of
strategies and λ is the Lipschitz constant of the utili-
ties. Finally, we show that there is a PTAS for finding
an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium when the number of
strategies is two.
1 Introduction
Will you come to FOCS? This decision depends on
many factors, but one of them is how many other the-
oreticians will come. Now, whether each of them will
come depends in a small way on what you will do, and
hence this aspect of the decision to go to FOCS is game-
theoretic — and in fact of a particular specialized sort
explored in this paper: Each player has a small num-
ber of strategies (in this example, two), and the utility
of each player depends on her/his own decision, as well
as on how many other players will choose each of these
strategies. It is crucial that the utilities do not depend on
the identity of the players making these choices (that is,
we ignore here your interest in whether your friends will
come). Such games are called anonymous games, and in
this paper we give two polynomial algorithms for com-
puting approximate equilibria in these games. In fact,
our algorithms work in a generalized framework: The
players can be divided into a few types (e.g., colleagues,
students, big shots, etc.), and your utility depends on
how many of the players of each type choose each of the
∗The authors were supported through NSF grant CCF - 0635319, a
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strategies.
Notice that this is a much more general framework
than that of symmetric games (where all players are
identical); each player can have a very individual way
of evaluating the situation, and her/his utility can de-
pend on the choices of others in an individual arbitrary
way; in particular, there may be no monotonicity: For
example, a player may prefer a mob with 1000 atten-
dees, mostly students, to a tiny workshop of 20, while a
medium-sized conference of 200 may be more attractive
than either; a second player may order these in the exact
opposite way. Anonymous games comprise a broad and
well studied class of games (see e.g. [4, 5, 16] for recent
work on this subject by economists) which are of special
interest to the Algorithmic Game Theory community, as
they capture important aspects of auctions and markets,
as well as of Internet congestion.
Our interest lies in computing Nash equilibria in such
games. The problem of computing Nash equilibria in a
game was recently shown to be PPAD-complete in gen-
eral [9], even for the two-player case [6]. Since that neg-
ative result, the research effort in this area was, quite
predictably, directed towards two goals: (1) comput-
ing approximate equilibria (mixed strategy profiles from
which no player has incentive more than ǫ to defect), and
(2) exploring the algorithmic properties of special cases
of games. The approximation front has been especially
fertile, with several positive and negative results shown
recently [19, 7, 18, 10, 11, 13].
What is known about special cases of the Nash equi-
librium problem? Several important cases are now
known to be generic; these include, beyond the afore-
mentioned 2-player games, win-lose games (games with
0-1 utilities) [1], and several kinds of succinctly repre-
sentable games such as graphical games [9] and anony-
mous games (actually, the even more specialized sym-
metric games [14]). For anonymous games, the gener-
icity argument goes as follows: Any game can be made
anonymous by expanding the strategy space so that each
player first chooses an identity (and is punished is s/he
fails to choose her/his own) and then a strategy; it is easy
to see that, in this expanded strategy space, the utili-
ties can be rendered in the anonymous fashion. Note,
however, that this manoeuvre requires a large strategy
space; in contrast, for other succinct games such as the
graphical ones, genericity persists even when the num-
ber of strategies is two [15]. Are anonymous games eas-
ier when the number of strategies is fixed? We shall see
that this is indeed the case.
How about tractable special cases? Here there is a
relative poverty of results. The zero-sum two-player
case is, of course, well known [22]. It was general-
ized in [17] to low-rank games (the matrix A + B is
not quite zero, but has fixed rank), a case in which a
PTAS for the Nash equilibrium problem is possible. It
was also known that symmetric games with (about log-
arithmically) few strategies per player can be solved ex-
actly in polynomial time by a reduction to the theory of
real closed fields [23]. For congestion games we can
find in polynomial time a pure Nash equilibrium if the
game is a symmetric network congestion game [12], and
an approximate pure Nash equilibrium if the congestion
game is symmetric (but not necessarily network) and the
utilities are somehow “continuous” [8]. Finally, in [20]
Milchtaich showed that anonymous congestion games in
graphs consisting of parallel links (equivalently, anony-
mous games in which the utility of a player, for each
choice made by the player, is a nondecreasing function
of the number of players who have chosen the same
strategy) have pure Nash equilibria which can be com-
puted in polynomial time by a natural greedy algorithm.
In this paper we prove two positive approximation
results for anonymous games with a fixed number s of
strategies. Our first result states that any such game has
a pure Nash equilibrium that is ǫ-approximate, where
ǫ is bounded from above by a function of the form
f(s)λ. Here λ is the Lipschitz constant of the utility
functions (a measure of continuity of the utility func-
tions of the players, assumed to be such that for any
partitions x and y of the players into the s strategies,
|u(x)− u(y)| ≤ λ||x− y||1). To get a sense of scale for
λ note that the arguments of u range from 0 to n and so,
if u were a linear function in the range [0, 1], λ would
be at most 1n . f(s) is a quadratic function of the num-
ber of strategies. That ǫ cannot be smaller than λ is easy
to see (the matching pennies problem provides an easy
example); the results of [8] for congestion games show
a similar dependence on λ (what they call “the bounded
jump property”). We conjecture that the dependence on
s can be improved to sλ. Our proof uses Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem on an interpolation of the (discrete) best-
response function to identify a simplex of pure strategy
profiles and from that produce, by a geometric argu-
ment, a pure strategy profile that is ǫ-approximate, with
ǫ bounded as above.
Our second result is a PTAS for the case of two strate-
gies. The main idea is to round the mixed strategies of
the players to some nearby multiple of ǫ; then each such
quantized mixed strategy can be considered a pure strat-
egy, and, with finitely many –in particular O(1/ǫ)– pure
strategies, an anonymous game can be solved exhaus-
tively in polynomial time in n, the number of players.
The only problem is, why should the expected utilities
before and after the quantization be close? Here we rely
on a probabilistic lemma (Theorem 3.1) that may be of
much more general interest: Given n Bernoulli random
variables with probabilities p1, . . . , pn, there is a way
to round the probabilities to multiples of 1/k, for any
k, so that the distribution of the sum of these n vari-
ables is affected only by an additive O
(
1/
√
k
)
in total
variational distance (no dependence on n). This implies
that the expected utilities of the quantized version are
within an additive±O
(
1/
√
k
)
of the original ones, and
an O
(
n1/ǫ
2
)
PTAS for two-strategy anonymous games
is immediate. We feel that a more sophisticated proof
of the same kind can establish a similar result for multi-
nomial distributions, thus extending our PTAS to anony-
mous games with any fixed number of strategies.
1.1 Definitions and Notation
An anonymous game G = (n, s, {upi }) consists of
a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n ≥ 2 of players, a set
[s] = {1, . . . , s} of s ≥ 2 strategies, and a set of ns util-
ity functions, where upi with p ∈ [n] and i ∈ [s] is the
utility of player p when she plays strategy i, a function
mapping the set of partitions Πsn−1 = {(x1, . . . , xs) :
xi ∈ N0 for all i ∈ [s],
∑s
i=1 xi = n − 1} to the in-
terval [0, 1] 1. Our working assumptions are that n is
large and s is fixed; notice that, in this case, anonymous
games are succinctly representable [23], in the sense that
their representation requires specifying O(ns+1) num-
bers, as opposed to the nsn numbers required for gen-
eral games (arguably, succinct games are the only mul-
tiplayer games that are computationally meaningful, see
[23] for an extensive discussion of this point). For our
approximate pure Nash equilibrium result we shall also
be assuming that the utility functions are continuous, in
the following sense: There is a real λ > 0, presumably
very small, such that |upi (x) − upi (y)| ≤ λ · ||x − y||1
for every p ∈ [n], i ∈ [s], and x, y ∈ Πsn−1. This
continuity concept is similar to the “bounded jump” as-
sumption of [8]. The convex hull of the set Πsn−1 will
be denoted by ∆sn−1 = {(x1, . . . , xs) : xi ≥ 0, i =
1, . . . , s,
∑s
i=1 xi = n− 1}.
1In the literature on Nash approximation utilities are usually nor-
malized this way so that the approximation error is additive.
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A pure strategy profile in such a game is a map-
ping S from [n] to [s]. A pure strategy profile S is an
ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, where ǫ > 0,
if, for all p ∈ [n], upS(p)(x[S, p]) + ǫ ≥ upi (x[S, p])
for all i ∈ [s], where x[S, p] ∈ Πsn−1 is the parti-
tion (x1, . . . , xs) such that xi is the number of players
q ∈ [n]− {p} such that S(q) = i.
A mixed strategy profile is a set of n distributions
δp, p ∈ [n], over [s]. A mixed strategy profile is an ǫ-
approximate mixed Nash equilibrium if, for all p ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [s], Eδ1,...,δnupi (x)+ǫ ≥ Eδ1,...,δnupj (x) where,
for the purposes of the expectation, i is drawn from [s]
according to δp and x is drawn from Πsn−1 by drawing
n−1 random samples from [s] independently according
to the distributions δq, q 6= p and forming the induced
partition.
Anonymous games can be extended to ones in which
there is also a finite number of types of players, and util-
ities depend on how each type is partitioned into strate-
gies; all our algorithms, being exhaustive, can be easily
generalized to this framework, with the number of types
multiplying the exponent.
2 Approximate Pure Equilibria
In this section we prove the following result:
Theorem 2.1 In any anonymous game with s strategies
and Lipschitz constant λ there is an ǫ-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium, where ǫ = O(s2)λ.
Proof: We first define a function φ from Πsn−1 to itself:
For any x ∈ Πsn−1, φ(x) is defined to be (y1, . . . , ys) ∈
Πsn−1 such that, for all i ∈ [s], yi is the number of all
those players p among {1, . . . , n−1} (notice that player
n is excluded) such that, for all j < i, upi [x] > upj [x],
and, for all j > i, upi [x] ≥ upj [x]. In other words, φ(x)
is the partition induced among the first n− 1 players by
their best response to x, where ties are broken lexico-
graphically.
We next interpolate φ to obtain a continuous func-
tion φˆ from ∆sn−1 to itself as follows: For each x ∈
∆sn−1 let us break x into its integer and fractional parts
x = xI + xF , where xI ∈ Πsn−1 and 0 ≤ xFi ≤ 1
for all i = 1, . . . , s − 1. Let c[xI ] be the cell of xI ,
the set of all x′ ∈ Πsn−1 such that, for all i ≤ s − 1,
x′i = x
I
i or x
′
i = x
I
i + 1. Then it is clear that x
can be written as a convex combination of the elements
of c[xI ]: x =
∑
xj∈c[xI ] αjx
j
. We define φˆ(x) to be∑
xj∈c[xI ] αjφ(x
j).
It is possible to define the interpolation at each point
x ∈ ∆sn−1 in a consistent way so that the resulting φˆ(x)
is a continuous function from the compact set ∆sn−1
to itself, and so, by Brouwer’s Theorem, it must have
a fixed point, that is, a point x∗ ∈ ∆sn−1 such that
φˆ(x∗) = x∗. That is,∑
xj∈c[x∗I ]
αjφ(x
j) = x∗ =
∑
xj∈c[x∗I]
αjx
j . (1)
By Carathe´odory’s lemma, equation (1) can be ex-
pressed as the sum of only s of the φ(xj)’s x∗ =∑s
j=1 γjφ(x
j), and it is easy to see that it can be rewrit-
ten as
x∗ = φ(x1) +
s∑
j=2
γj(φ(x
j)− φ(x1)), (2)
for some γj ≥ 0 with
∑
j γj = 1.
Recall that, in order to prove the theorem, we need to
exhibit ǫ-approximate pure strategy profile. If x∗ were
an integer point, then we would be almost done (modulo
the n-th player, of whom we take care last), and x∗ itself
(actually, the strategy profile suggested by the partition
φ(x∗)) would be essentially a pure Nash equilibrium,
because of the equation x∗ = φ(x∗). But in general
x∗ will be fractional, and the various φ(xj)’s will be
very far from x∗ (except that they happen to have x∗
in their convex hull). Our plan is to show that x1 (a
vertex in the cell of x∗) is an approximate pure Nash
equilibrium (again, considered as a pure strategy profile
and forgetting for a moment the n-th player).
The term φ(x1) in equation (2) can be seen as a pure
strategy profile P : Each of the n−1 players chooses the
strategy that is her/his best response to x1. Therefore,
in this strategy profile everybody would be happy if ev-
erybody else played according to x1. The problem is, of
course, that φ(x1) can be very far from x1. We shall next
use equation (2) to “move it” close to x1 (more precisely,
close to x∗ which we know is 2s-close in L1 distance to
x1) without changing the utilities much. Looking at one
of the other terms of (2), (φ(xj)− φ(x1)), we can think
of it as the act of switching certain players from their
best response to x1 to their best response to xj . The cru-
cial observation is that, since x1 and xj are at most 2s
apart in L1 distance (they both belong to the same cell),
the change in utility for the switching players would be
at most 4sλ.
So, equation (2) suggests that a strategy profile close
to x∗ can be obtained from P by combining these s− 1
flows, with little harm in utility for all players involved.
The problem is how to combine them so that the right
individual players are switched (the situation is akin
to integer multicommodity flow). We write each flow
(φ(xj)−φ(x1)) as the sum of s2 terms of the form f ji,i′ ,
signifying the number of individual players moved from
strategy i to strategy i′. We know that, for each such
nonzero flow, there is a set of players Sji,i′ ⊆ [n] which
can be moved with only 4sλ loss in utility. The union
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over j of the (s − 1) sets Sji,i′ is denoted by Si,i′ and
the union over i′ of the sets Si,i′ by Si. The following
lemma can be proved by an application of Hall’s Theo-
rem.
Lemma 2.2 There exist disjoint subsets Ti,i′ ⊆ Si,i′ ,
i′ = 1, . . . , s, such that, for all i′ = 1, . . . , s, |Ti,i′ | =
⌊∑sj=2 γjf ji,i′⌋.
Proof: Let us consider the bipartite graph with ver-
tex set Si ⊔ [s] and an edge from a player p ∈ Si to
a strategy i′ ∈ [s] if, for some j, p ∈ Sji,i′ . To estab-
lish the result it is enough to show that there exists a
generalized matching of players to pure strategies —in
which every player is matched to at most one pure strat-
egy, so that, for all i′, strategy i′ is matched with at least
Ri′ := ⌊
∑s
j=2 γjf
j
i,i′⌋ players.
By Hall’s theorem, such a matching exists if every set
of strategies J ⊆ [s] “knows” at least ∑i′∈J Ri′ play-
ers. Observe that, for all j, the family of sets {Sji,i′}i′
are disjoint. Hence
∑
i′∈J
f ji,i′ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
i′∈J
Sji,i′
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
i′∈J
Si,i′
∣∣∣∣∣ = |Γ(J )|,
where Γ(J ) represents the neighborhood in Si of the
pure strategies of the set J . From the above equation it
follows that∑
j
γj
∑
i′∈J
f ji,i′ ≤
∑
j
γj |Γ(J )| ≤ |Γ(J )|
⇒
∑
i′∈J
∑
j
γjf
j
i,i′ ≤ |Γ(J )| ⇒
∑
i′∈J
Ri′ ≤ |Γ(J )|,
which completes the proof. 
Thus, by moving the players in Ti,i′ from i to i′, for
all pairs of i, i′, we obtain from strategy profile P a
new strategy profile P˜ in which each player’s strategy
is within 4sλ from their response to x1, and such that
the corresponding partition x˜∗ is, by equation (2) and
the roundings in the lemma, at most 2s2 away from x∗,
and hence at most 2s more away from x1; let’s call the
distance bound D = 2s2 + 2s. Since, for all players
—except for the last of course, P˜ is an 4sλ-approximate
response to x1 and P˜ is within distance D from x1, it
follows that P˜ is a 4(D+s)λ-approximate best response
to itself.
Finally, we turn to player n. Adding the best response
of player n to P˜ , and subtracting what player i plays in
P˜ , we get a profile that is 2 away, in L1 distance, from
P˜ , thus making P˜ a 4(D + s + 1)λ-approximate Nash
equilibrium and completing the proof. 
Since Πsn−1 has O(ns) points, and this is the length
of the input, the algorithmic implication is immediate:
Corollary 2.3 In any anonymous game, an ǫ-
approximate pure Nash equilibrium, where ǫ is as
in Theorem 2.1, can be found in linear time.
3 Approximate Mixed Nash Equilibria
3.1 A Probabilistic Lemma
We start by a definition. The total variation distance
between two distributions P and Q supported on a finite
set A is
||P−Q|| = 1
2
∑
α∈A
|P(α)−Q(α)|.
Theorem 3.1 Let {pi}ni=1 be arbitrary probabilities,
pi ∈ [0, 1], for i = 1, . . . , n, and let {Xi}ni=1 be in-
dependent indicator random variables, such that Xi has
expectation E [Xi] = pi, and let k be a positive integer.
Then there exists another set of probabilities {qi}ni=1,
qi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . , n, which satisfy the following
properties:
1. ||qi − pi|| = O(1/k), for all i = 1, . . . , n
2. qi is an integer multiple of 1k , for all i = 1, . . . , n
3. if {Yi}ni=1 are independent indicator random vari-
ables such that Yi has expectation E [Yi] = qi, then,∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Xi −
∑
i
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ = O(k−1/2).
and, moreover, for all j = 1, . . . , n,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i6=j
Xi −
∑
i6=j
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O(k−1/2).
From this, the main result of this section follows:
Corollary 3.2 There is a PTAS for the mixed Nash equi-
librium problem for two-strategy anonymous games.
Proof: Let (p1, . . . , pn) be a mixed Nash equilibrium
of the game. We claim that (q1, . . . , qn), where the
qi’s are the multiples of 1/k specified by Theorem 3.1,
constitute a O(1/
√
k)-approximate mixed Nash equilib-
rium. Indeed, for every player i ∈ [n] and every strat-
egy m ∈ {1, 2} for that player let us track the change
in the expected utility of the player when the distribu-
tion over Π2n−1 defined by the {pj}j 6=i is replaced by
the distribution defined by the {qj}j 6=i. It is not hard to
see that the absolute change is bounded by the total vari-
ation distance between the distributions of the
∑
j 6=iXj
4
and the
∑
j 6=i Yj
2 where Xj , Yj are indicators corre-
sponding to whether player j plays strategy 2 in the dis-
tribution defined by the pi’s and the qi’s respectively, i.e.
E [Xj ] = pj and E [Yj ] = qj . Hence, the change in utility
is at most O(1/
√
k), which implies that the qi’s consti-
tute an O(1/
√
k)-approximate Nash equilibrium of the
game, modulo the following observation: with a trivial
modification in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we can ensure
sure that, when switching from pi’s to qi’s, for every i,
the support of qi is a subset of the support of pi.
To compute a quantized approximate Nash equilib-
rium of the original game, we proceed to define a related
(k + 1)-strategy game, where k = O
(
1
ǫ2
)
, and treat the
problem as a pure Nash equilibrium problem. It is not
hard to see that the latter is efficiently solvable if the
number of strategies is a constant. The new game is de-
fined as follows: the i-th pure strategy, i = 0, . . . , k, cor-
responds to a player in the original game playing strat-
egy 2 with probability ik . Naturally, the payoffs resulting
from a pure strategy profile in the new game are defined
to be equal to the corresponding payoffs in the original
game, by the translation of the pure strategy profile of
the former into a mixed strategy profile of the latter. In
particular, for any player p, we can compute its payoff
given any strategy i ∈ {0, . . . , k} for that player and
any partition x ∈ ∏k+1n−1 of the other players into k + 1
strategies, in time nO(1/ǫ2) overall, by a straightforward
dynamic programming algorithm, see for example [24].
The remaining details are omitted. 
Remark: Note that it is crucial for the proof of Corol-
lary 3.2 that the bound on the total variation distance
between the
∑
iXi and the
∑
i Yi in the statement of
the Theorem 3.1 does not depend on the number n of
random variables which are being rounded, but only on
the accuracy 1k of the rounding. Because of this re-
quirement, several simple methods of rounding are eas-
ily seen to fail:
• Rounding to the Closest Multiple of 1/k: An easy
counterexample for this method arises when pi :=
1
n , for all i. In this case, the trivial rounding would
make qi := 0, for all i, and the total variation dis-
tance between the
∑
iXi and the
∑
i Yi would be-
come arbitrarily close to 1− 1e , as n goes to infinity.
• Randomized Rounding: An argument employing
the probabilistic method could start by indepen-
dently rounding each pi to some random qi which
is an integer multiple of 1k in such a way thatE [qi] = pi. This seems promising since, by inde-
pendence, for any ℓ = 0, . . . , n, the random vari-
able Pr[
∑
i Yi = ℓ], which is a function of the qi’s,
2Recall that all utilities have been normalized to take values in
[0, 1].
has the correct expectation, i.e. E [Pr[∑i Yi] =
ℓ] = Pr[
∑
iXi = ℓ]. The trouble is that the ex-
pectation of the random variable Pr[
∑
i Yi = ℓ]
is very small: less than 1 for all ℓ and, in fact, in
the order of of O(1/n) for many terms. Moreover,
the function itself comprises of sums of products on
the random variables qi, in fact exponentially many
terms for some values of ℓ. Concentration seems to
require k which scales polynomially in n.
Proof Technique: We follow instead a completely dif-
ferent approach which aims at directly approximating
the distribution of the
∑
iXi. The intuition is the fol-
lowing: The distribution of the
∑
iXi should be close
in total variation distance to a Poisson distribution of the
same mean
∑
i pi. Hence, it seems that, if we define
qi’s —which are multiples of 1k— in such a way that the
means
∑
i pi and
∑
i qi are close, then the distribution
of the
∑
i Yi should be close in total variation distance
to the same Poisson distribution and hence to the distri-
bution of the
∑
iXi by triangle inequality.
There are several complications, of course, the main
one being that the distribution of the
∑
iXi can be
well approximated by a Poisson distribution of the same
mean only when the pi’s are relatively small. When the
pi’s take arbitrary values in [0, 1] and n scales, the Pois-
son distribution can be very far from the distribution of
the
∑
iXi. In fact, we wouldn’t expect that the Pois-
son distribution can approximate the distribution of ar-
bitrary sums of indicators since its mean and variance
are the same. To counter this we resort to a special kind
of distributions, called translated Poisson distributions,
which are Poisson distributions appropriately shifted on
their domain. An arbitrary sum of indicators can be now
approximated as follows: a Poisson distribution is de-
fined with mean — and, hence, variance — equal to the
variance of the sum of the indicators; then the distribu-
tion is appropriately shifted on its domain so that its new
mean coincides with the mean of the sum of the indica-
tors being approximated.
The translated Poisson approximation will outper-
form the Poisson approximation for intermediate values
of the pi’s, while the Poisson approximation will remain
better near the boundaries, i.e. for values of pi close to 0
or 1. Even for the intermediate region of values for the
pi’s, the translated Poisson approximation is not suffi-
cient since it only succeeds when the number of the indi-
cators being summed over is relatively large, compared
to the minimum expectation. A different argument is re-
quired when this is not the case. Our bounding technique
has to interleave these considerations in a very delicate
fashion to achieve the approximation result. At a high
level, we treat separately the Xi’s with small, medium
or large expectation; in particular, for some α ∈ (0, 1)
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to be fixed later, we define the following subintervals of
[0, 1]:
1. L(k) :=
[
0, ⌊k
α⌋
k
)
: interval of small expectations;
2. M1(k) :=
[
⌊kα⌋
k ,
k/2
k
)
: first interval of medium
expectations;
3. M2(k) :=
[
k/2
k , 1− ⌊k
α⌋
k
)
: second interval of
medium expectations;
4. H(k) :=
[
1− ⌊kα⌋k , 1
]
: interval of high expecta-
tions.
Denoting L∗(k) := {i | E [Xi] ∈ L(k)}, we establish
(Lemma 3.9) that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈L∗(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈L∗(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O(k−1/2)
and similarly for M1(k) (Lemma 3.12). Symmetric ar-
guments (setting X ′i = 1 − Xi and Y ′i = 1 − Yi) im-
ply the same bounds for the intervalsM2(k) and H(k).
Therefore, an application of the coupling lemma implies
that ∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Xi −
∑
i
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ = O(k−1/2),
which concludes the proof. The details of the proof are
postponed to Section 3.3. The proof for the partial sums∑
i6=j Xi and
∑
i6=j Yi follows easily from the analy-
sis of Section 3.3 and its details are skipped for this ex-
tended abstract. The next section provides the required
background on Poisson approximations.
3.2 Poisson Approximations
The following theorem is classical in the theory of
Poisson approximations.
Theorem 3.3 ([2]) Let J1, . . . , Jn be a sequence of in-
dependent random indicators with E [Ji] = pi. Then∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Ji − Poisson
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑n
i=1 p
2
i∑n
i=1 pi
.
As discussed in the previous section, the above bound is
sharp when the indicators have small expectations, but
loose when the indicators are arbitrary. The following
approximation bound becomes sharp when the previous
is not. But first let us formally define the translated Pois-
son distribution.
Definition 3.4 ([25]) We say that an integer random
variable Y has a translated Poisson distribution with
paremeters µ and σ2 and write
L(Y ) = TP (µ, σ2)
if L(Y −⌊µ−σ2⌋) = Poisson(σ2+ {µ−σ2}), where
{µ− σ2} represents the fractional part of µ− σ2.
Theorem 3.5 provides an approximation result for the
translated Poisson distribution using Stein’s method.
Theorem 3.5 ([25]) Let J1, . . . , Jn be a sequence of in-
dependent random indicators with E [Ji] = pi. Then∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Ji − TP (µ, σ2)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√∑n
i=1 p
3
i (1− pi) + 2∑n
i=1 pi(1 − pi)
,
where µ =
∑n
i=1 pi and σ2 =
∑n
i=1 pi(1− pi).
Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 provide respectively bounds for the
total variation distance between two Poisson distribu-
tions and two translated Poisson distributions with dif-
ferent parameters. The proof of 3.6 is postponed to the
appendix, while the proof of 3.7 is provided in [3].
Lemma 3.6 Let λ1, λ2 ∈ R+ \ {0} . Then
||Poisson(λ1)− Poisson(λ2)||
≤ e|λ1−λ2| − e−|λ1−λ2|.
Lemma 3.7 ([3]) Let µ1, µ2 ∈ R and σ21 , σ22 ∈ R+ \
{0} be such that ⌊µ1 − σ21⌋ ≤ ⌊µ2 − σ22⌋. Then∣∣∣∣TP (µ1, σ21)− TP (µ2, σ22)∣∣∣∣
≤ |µ1 − µ2|
σ1
+
|σ21 − σ22 |+ 1
σ21
.
3.3 Proof Theorem 3.1
In this section we complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
As argued above, it is enough to round the random vari-
ables {Xi}i∈L∗(k) into random variables {Yi}i∈L∗(k) so
that the total variation distance between the random vari-
ables XL :=
∑
i∈L∗(k)Xi and YL :=
∑
i∈L∗(k) Yi is
small and similarly for the subintervalM1(k).
Our rounding will have different objective in the two
regions. When rounding theXi’s with i ∈ L∗(k) we aim
to approximate the mean ofXL as tightly as possible. On
the other hand, when rounding theXi’s with i ∈M∗1(k),
we give up on approximating the mean very tightly in
order to also approximate well the variance. The details
of the rounding follow.
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Some notation first: Let us partition the interval
[0, 1/2] into ⌈k/2⌉ subintervals I0, I1, . . . , I⌊k/2⌋ where
I0 =
[
0,
1
k
)
, I1 =
[
1
k
,
2
k
)
, . . . , I⌊k/2⌋ =
[⌊k/2⌋
k
, 1/2
]
.
The intervals I0, . . . , I⌊k/2⌋ define the partition of
L∗(k) ∪ M∗1(k) into the subsets I∗0 , I∗1 , . . . , I∗⌊k/2⌋,
where
I∗j = {i | E [Xi] ∈ Ij}, j = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊k/2⌋.
For all j ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊k/2⌋} with I∗j 6= ∅, let I∗j =
{j1, j2, . . . , jnj} and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , nj}, let
pji := E [Xji ] and δji := pji −
j
k
.
We proceed to define the “rounding” of the Xi’s into
the Yi’s in the intervals L(k) and M1(k) separately.
Interval L(k) :=
[
0, ⌊k
α⌋
k
)
of small expectations.
Observe first that L(k) ≡ I0 ∪ . . . ∪ I⌊kα⌋−1 and define
the corresponding subset of the indices L∗(k) := I∗0 ∪
. . . ∪ I∗⌊kα⌋−1. We define the Yi, i ∈ L∗(k), via the
following iterative procedure. Our ultimate goal is to
round the Xi’s into Yi’s appropriately so that the sum of
the expectations of the Xi’s and of the Yi’s are as close
as possible. The rounding procedure is as follows.
i. ǫ0 := 0;
ii. for j := 0 to ⌊kα⌋ − 1
(a) Sj := ǫj +
∑nj
i=1 δ
j
i ;
(b) mj :=
⌊
Sj
k−1
⌋
; ǫj+1 := Sj −mj · 1k ;
{assertion: mj ≤ nj - see justification next}
(c) set qji := j+1k for i = 1, ...,mj and qji := jk
for i = mj + 1, ..., nj;
(d) for all i ∈ {1, ..., nj}, let Yji be a {0, 1}-
random variable with expectation qji ;
iii. Suppose that the random variables Yi, i ∈ L∗(k),
are mutually independent.
It is easy to see that, for all j ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊kα⌋ − 1},
ǫj <
1
k ; this follows immediately from the description
of the procedure, in particular Steps i and ii(b). This
further implies that mj ≤ nj , for all j, since at Step
ii(b) we have
Sj
k−1
=
ǫj +
∑nj
i=1 δ
j
i
k−1
<
k−1 + njk
−1
k−1
= 1 + nj .
Hence, the assertion following Step ii(b) is satisfied. Fi-
nally, note that, for all j,
nj∑
i=1
qji = mj
j + 1
k
+ (nj −mj) j
k
= nj
j
k
+mj
1
k
= nj
j
k
+ Sj − ǫj+1
= nj
j
k
+
nj∑
i=1
δji + ǫj − ǫj+1 =
nj∑
i=1
pji + ǫj − ǫj+1.
Therefore,
⌊kα⌋−1∑
j=0
nj∑
i=1
qji =
⌊kα⌋−1∑
j=0
nj∑
i=1
pji + ǫ0 − ǫ⌊kα⌋,
which implies
Lemma 3.8 |∑i∈L∗(k) E [Yi]−∑i∈L∗(k) E [Xi]| ≤ 1k .
The following lemma characterizes the total variation
distance between
∑
i∈L∗(k)Xi and
∑
i∈L∗(k) Yi.
Lemma 3.9
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑i∈L∗(k)Xi −∑i∈L∗(k) Yi∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3k1−α .
Proof: By lemma 3.3 we have that
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈L∗(k)
Xi − Poisson

 ∑
i∈L∗(k)
pi


∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i∈L∗(k) p
2
i∑
i∈L∗(k) pi
and∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈L∗(k)
Yi − Poisson

 ∑
i∈L∗(k)
qi


∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i∈L∗(k) q
2
i∑
i∈L∗(k) qi
,
where pi := E [Xi] and qi := E [Yi] for all i. The follow-
ing lemma is proven in the appendix.
Lemma 3.10 For any u > 0 and any set {pi}i∈I , where
pi ∈ [0, u], for all i ∈ I,∑
i∈I p
2
i∑
i∈I pi
≤ u.
Using Lemmas 3.10, 3.8 and 3.6 and the triangle in-
equality we get that
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈L∗(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈L∗(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
2
k1−α
+ (e
1
k − e− 1k )
≤ 3
k1−α
,
where we used the fact that e 1k − e− 1k ≤ 3k ≤ 1k1−α , for
sufficiently large k. 
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Interval M1(k) :=
[
⌊kα⌋
k ,
k/2
k
)
: medium expecta-
tions.
Observe first that M1(k) ≡ I⌊kα⌋ ∪ . . .∪ I⌊k/2⌋ and de-
fine the corresponding subset of the indices M∗1(k) :=
I∗⌊kα⌋ ∪ . . . ∪ I∗⌊k/2⌋ . We define the Yi, i ∈ M∗1(k), via
the following procedure which is slightly different than
the one we used for the set of indices L∗(k). Our goal
here is to approximate well both the mean and the vari-
ance of the sum
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)Xi. In fact, we will give up
on approximating the mean as tightly as possible, which
we did above, in order achieve a good approximation of
the variance. The rounding procedure is as follows.
for j := ⌊kα⌋ to ⌊k2 ⌋
(a) Sj :=
∑nj
i=1 δ
j
i ;
(b) mj :=
⌊
Sj
k−1
⌋
;
(c) set qji := j+1k for i = 1, ...,mj and qji := jk
for i = mj + 1, ..., nj;
(d) for all i ∈ {1, ..., nj}, let Yji be a {0, 1}-
random variable with expectation qji ;
Suppose that the random variables Yi, i ∈ M∗1(k),
are mutually independent.
Lemma 3.11 characterizes the quality of the rounding
procedure in terms of mean and variance. Defining
ζj :=
∑
i∈I∗
j
E [Xi]−
∑
i∈I∗
j
E [Yi], we have
Lemma 3.11 For all j ∈ {⌊kα⌋, . . . , ⌊k2⌋}
(a) ζj =
∑nj
i=1 δ
j
i −mj 1k .
(b) 0 ≤ ζj ≤ 1k .
(c) ∑i∈I∗
j
Var[Xi] = nj jk
(
1− jk
)
+(
1− 2jk
)∑nj
i=1 δ
j
i −
∑nj
i=1 (δ
j
i )
2
(d) ∑i∈I∗
j
Var[Yi] = nj jk
(
1− jk
)
+mj
1
k
(
1− 2j+1k
)
(e) ∑i∈I∗
j
Var[Xi] −
∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Yi] =
(
1− 2jk
)
ζj +(
mj
1
k2 −
∑nj
i=1 (δ
j
i )
2
)
.
The following lemma bounds the total variation dis-
tance between the random variables
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)Xi and∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) Yi.
Lemma 3.12
∣∣∣∣∣∣∑i∈M∗
1
(k)Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
+O(k−α) +O(k−
1
2 ) +O(k−(1−β)).
Proof: We distinguish two cases for the size ofM∗1(k).
For some β ∈ (0, 1) such that α + β > 1, let us distin-
guish two possibilities for the size of |M∗1(k)|:
a. |M∗1(k)| ≤ kβ
b. |M∗1(k)| > kβ
Let us treat each interval separately in the following lem-
mas.
Lemma 3.13 If |M∗1(k)| ≤ kβ then∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
k1−β
.
Proof: The proof follows from the coupling lemma and
an easy coupling argument. The details are postponed to
the appendix. 
Lemma 3.14 If |M∗1(k)| > kβ then∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
+O(k−α) +O(k−
1
2 ).
Proof: By lemma 3.5 we have that
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi − TP
(
µ1, σ
2
1
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
√∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) p
3
i (1− pi) + 2∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) pi(1− pi)
and ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi − TP
(
µ2, σ
2
2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
√∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) q
3
i (1 − qi) + 2∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) qi(1− qi)
where µ1 =
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) pi, µ2 =
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) qi, σ
2
1 =∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) pi(1 − pi), σ22 =
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) qi(1 − qi) and
pi := E [Xi], qi := E [Yi] for all i. The following lemma
is proven in the appendix.
Lemma 3.15 For any u ∈ (0, 12 ) and any set {pi}i∈I ,
where pi ∈ [u, 12 ], for all i ∈ I,√∑
i∈I p
3
i (1− pi)∑
i∈I pi(1− pi)
≤ (1 + 2u+ 4u
2 − 8u3)√
16|I|u(1− u− 4u2 + 4u3)
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Applying the above lemma with u = ⌊k
α⌋
k and I =M∗1(k), where recall |M∗1(k)| > kβ the above bound
becomes
(1 + 2u+ 4u2 − 8u3)√
16|I|u(1− u− 4u2 + 4u3) = O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
,
which implies
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi − TP
(
µ1, σ
2
1
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
(1)
and∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi − TP
(
µ2, σ
2
2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
, (2)
where we used that, for any set of values {pi ∈
M1(k)}i∈M∗
1
(k),
2∑
i∈M∗
1
(k) pi(1 − pi)
≤ 2
|M∗1(k)| ⌊[k
α⌋
k (1− ⌊[k
α⌋
k )
= O
(
k−(α+β−1)
)
and similarly for any set of values {qi ∈
M1(k)}i∈M∗
1
(k).
All that remains to do is to bound the total varia-
tion distance between the distributions TP (µ1, σ21) and
TP (µ2, σ
2
2) for the parameters µ1, σ21 , µ2, σ22 specified
above. The following claim is proved in the appendix.
Claim 3.16 For the parameters specified above
∣∣∣∣TP (µ1, σ21)− TP (µ2, σ22)∣∣∣∣ ≤ O(k−α) +O(k−1/2).
Claim 3.16 along with Equations (1) and (2) and the tri-
angle inquality imply that
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
+O(k−α) +O(k−1/2).


Putting Everything Together.
Suppose that the random variables {Yi}i defined above
are mutually independent. It follows that
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Xi −
∑
i
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
k−(1−α)
)
+O
(
k−
α+β−1
2
)
+O(k−α) +O(k−
1
2 ) +O(k−(1−β)).
Setting α = β = 34 we get a total variation distance
of O
(
k−1/4
)
. A more delicate argument establishes an
exponent of − 12 .
4 Open Problems
Can our PTAS be extended to arbitrary fixed number
of strategies? We believe so. A more sophisticated tech-
nique would subdivide, instead of the interval [0, 1] as
our proof did, the (s− 1)-dimensional simplex into do-
mains in which multinomial (instead of binomial) distri-
butions would be approximated in different ways, possi-
bly using the techniques of [26]. This way of extending
our result already seems to work for s = 3, and we are
hopeful that it will work for general fixed s.
Can the quadratic, in s, approximation bound of our
pure Nash equilibrium algorithm be improved to linear?
We believe so, and we conjecture that sλ is a lower
bound.
We hope that the ways of thinking about anonymous
games introduced in this paper will eventually lead to al-
gorithms for the practical solution of this important class
of games. Moreover, a technique involving probability
rounding similar to the one used here yields a quasi-
polynomial time approximation scheme for finding a
Nash equilibrium in general normal form games with a
fixed number of strategies, as well as for large classes of
graphical games of this sort (work in progress). Improv-
ing this to polynomial is another important open prob-
lem.
Acknowledgment: We want to thank Uri Feige for a
helpful discussion.
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APPENDIX
A Missing Proofs
Proof of lemma 3.6: Without loss of generality assume that 0 < λ1 ≤ λ2 and denote δ = λ2 − λ1. For all i ∈
{0, 1, . . .}, denote
pi = e
−λ1
λi1
i!
and qi = e−λ2
λi2
i!
.
Finally, define I∗ = {i : pi ≥ qi}.
We have
∑
i∈I∗
|pi − qi| =
∑
i∈I∗
(pi − qi) ≤
∑
i∈I∗
1
i!
(e−λ1λi1 − e−λ1−δλi1)
=
∑
i∈I∗
1
i!
e−λ1λi1(1− e−δ)
≤ (1− e−δ)
n∑
i=0
1
i!
e−λ1λi1 = 1− e−δ.
On the other hand
∑
i/∈I∗
|pi − qi| =
∑
i/∈I∗
(qi − pi) ≤
∑
i/∈I∗
1
i!
(e−λ1(λ1 + δ)
i − e−λ1λi1)
=
∑
i/∈I∗
1
i!
e−λ1((λ1 + δ)
i − λi1)
≤
n∑
i=0
1
i!
e−λ1((λ1 + δ)
i − λi1)
= eδ
n∑
i=0
1
i!
e−(λ1+δ)(λ1 + δ)
i −
n∑
i=0
1
i!
e−λ1λi1
= eδ − 1.
Combining the above we get the result. 
Proof of lemma 3.10: For all i ∈ I and any choice of values pj ∈ [0, u], j ∈ I \ {i}, define the function
f(x) =
x2 +A
x+B
where A =
∑
j∈I\{i} p
2
j and B =
∑
j∈I\{i} pj ; observe that A ≤ uB.
If A = B = 0 then f(x) = x so f achieves its maximum at x = u.
If A 6= 0 6= B, the derivative of f is
f ′(x) =
−A+ x(2B + x)
(B + x)2
.
Denoting by h(x) the numerator of the above expression, the derivative of h is
h′(x) = 2B + 2x > 0, ∀x.
Therefore, h is increasing which implies that h(x) = 0 has at most one root and hence f ′(x) = 0 has at most one root
since the denominator in the above expression for f ′(x) is always positive. Note that f ′(0) < 0 whereas f ′(u) > 0.
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Therefore, there exists a unique ρ ∈ (0, u) such that f ′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ (0, ρ), f ′(ρ) = 0 and f ′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (ρ, u),
i.e. f is decreasing in (0, ρ) and increasing in (ρ, u). This implies that
max
x∈[0,u]
f(x) = max{f(0), f(u)}.
But f(u) = u
2+A
u+B ≥ AB = f(0) since A ≤ uB. Therefore, maxx f(x) = f(u).
From the above it follows that, independent of the values of
∑
j∈I\{i} p
2
i and
∑
j∈I\{i} pi, f(x) is maximized at
x = u. Therefore, the expression
P
i∈I
p2iP
i∈I
pi
is maximized when pi = u for all i ∈ I. This implies
∑
i∈I p
2
i∑
i∈I pi
≤ |I|u
2
|I|u ≤ u.

Proof of lemma 3.11: For (a) we have
ζj =
∑
i∈I∗
j
E [Xi]−
∑
i∈I∗
j
E [Yi] =
nj∑
i=1
pji −
nj∑
i=1
qji
=
nj∑
i=1
(
j
k
+ δji
)
−
(
mj
j + 1
k
+ (nj −mj) j
k
)
=
nj∑
i=1
δji −mj
1
k
.
To get (b) we notice that
nj∑
i=1
δji −mj
1
k
= Sj − ⌊Sjk⌋1
k
= Sj − (Sjk − (Sjk − ⌊Sjk⌋)) 1
k
= (Sjk − ⌊Sjk⌋)) 1
k
.
For (c), (d) and (e), observe that, for all ji ∈ I∗j , i ∈ {1, . . . , nj},
Var[Xji ] = p
j
i (1− pji ) = pji − (pji )2 = E [Xji ]−
(
j
k
+ δji
)2
=
j
k
+ δji −
(
j
k
+ δji
)2
Var[Yji ] = q
j
i − (qji )2 =
{
E [Yji ]− (j+1)
2
k2 , i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}
E [Yji ]− j
2
k2 , i ∈ {mj + 1, . . . , nj}
=
{
j+1
k − (j+1)
2
k2 , i ∈ {1, . . . ,mj}
j
k − j
2
k2 , i ∈ {mj + 1, . . . , nj}
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Hence,
∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Xi] =
nj∑
i=1
Var[Xji ] =
nj∑
i=1
E [Xji ]− nj
j2
k2
− 2 j
k
nj∑
i=1
δji −
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
= nj
j
k
+
nj∑
i=1
δji − nj
j2
k2
− 2 j
k
nj∑
i=1
δji −
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
= nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
+
(
1− 2j
k
) nj∑
i=1
δji −
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2.
∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Yi] =
nj∑
i=1
Var[Yji ] =
nj∑
i=1
E [Yji ]− nj
j2
k2
−mj 2j + 1
k2
= nj
j
k
+mj
1
k
− nj j
2
k2
−mj 2j + 1
k2
= nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
+mj
1
k
(
1− 2j + 1
k
)
.
and ∑
i∈I∗j
Var[Xi]−
∑
i∈I∗j
Var[Yi] =
=
(
nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
+
(
1− 2j
k
) nj∑
i=1
δji −
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
)
−
(
nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
+mj
1
k
(
1− 2j + 1
k
))
=
(
1− 2j
k
)( nj∑
i=1
δji −mj
1
k
)
+
(
mj
1
k2
−
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
)
=
(
1− 2j
k
)
ζj +
(
mj
1
k2
−
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
)
.

Proof of Lemma 3.13: The coupling lemma implies that for any joint distribution on {Xi}i ∪ {Yi}i the following is
satisfied ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Pr

 ∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi 6=
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi

 .
A union bound further implies
Pr

 ∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi 6=
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi

 ≤ Pr

 ∨
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi 6= Yi

 ≤ ∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Pr [Xi 6= Yi] .
Hence for any joint distribution on {Xi}i ∪ {Yi}i the following is satisfied∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Pr [Xi 6= Yi]. (3)
Let us now choose a joint distribution on {Xi}i ∪ {Yi}i in which, for all i, Xi and Yi are coupled in such a way that
Pr[Xi 6= Yi] ≤ 1
k
.
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This is easy to do since by construction |pi−qi| ≤ 1k , for all i. Plugging in Formula (3) the particular joint distributionjust described yields ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Xi −
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
Yi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
|M∗1(k)|
k
≤ 1
k1−β
.

Proof of lemma 3.15: For all i ∈ I and any choice of values pj ∈ [u, 12 ], j ∈ I \ {i}, define the function
f(x) =
x3(1 − x) +A
(x(1 − x) +B)2 , x ∈
[
u,
1
2
]
where A =
∑
j∈I\{i} p
3
j(1− pj) and B =
∑
j∈I\{i} pj(1− pj).
For the sake of the argument let us extend the range of f to [0, 12 ]. The derivative of f is
f ′(x) =
A(−2 + 4x) + x2(3B + x− 4Bx− x2)
(B + x− x2)3 ,
where note that the denominator is positive for all x ∈ [0, 12 ]. Denoting by h(x) the numerator of the above expression,
the derivative of h is
h′(x) = 4A+ (1 − 2x)x2 + 2x(x− x2) + 6Bx(1− 2x) > 0, ∀x ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
.
Therefore, h is increasing in (0, 12 ) which implies that h(x) = 0 has at most one root in (0,
1
2 ) and hence f
′(x) = 0
has at most one root in (0, 12 ) since the denominator in the above expression for f
′(x) is always positive. Note that
f ′(0) < 0 whereas f ′(12 ) > 0. Therefore, there exists a unique ρ ∈ (0, 12 ) such that f ′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ (0, ρ), f ′(ρ) = 0
and f ′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (ρ, 12 ), i.e. f is decreasing in (0, ρ) and increasing in (ρ, 12 ). This implies that
max
x∈[u,1/2]
f(x) = max {f(u), f(1/2)} .
Hence, the expression
P
i∈I
p3i (1−pi)
(
P
i∈I pi(1−pi))
2 is bounded by
max
m∈{0,...,|I|}
m
16 + (|I| −m)u3(1− u)
(m4 + (|I| −m)u(1− u))2
which we further bound by
max
x∈[0,|I|]
g(x)
where
g(x) :=
x
16 + (|I| − x)u3(1− u)
(x4 + (|I| − x)u(1− u))2
.
The derivative of g is
g′(x) =
4|I|u(1 + u− 6u2 + 12u3 − 8u4)− (1− 2u− 16u3 + 48u4 − 32u5)x
(1− 2u)−1(4|I|(1− u)u+ (1− 2u)2x)3 ,
where note that the denominator is positive for all u ∈ [0, 12 ] and the numerator is of the form A(u)−B(u)x where
A(u) := 4|I|u(1 + u− 6u2 + 12u3 − 8u4) > 0, ∀u ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
and
B(u) := 1− 2u− 16u3 + 48u4 − 32u5 > 0, ∀u ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
.
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Hence, if we take ζ := A(u)B(u) , g
′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0, ζ), g′(ζ) = 0 and g′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ (ζ,+∞), i.e. g is increasing in
(0, ζ) and decreasing in (ζ,+∞). This implies that g achieves its maximum at x := ζ. The maximum value itself is
g(ζ) =
(1 + 2u+ 4u2 − 8u3)2
16|I|u(1− u− 4u2 + 4u3) .
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of claim 3.16: From Lemma 3.7 if follows that
∣∣∣∣TP (µ1, σ21)− TP (µ2, σ22)∣∣∣∣ ≤ max
{ |µ1 − µ2|
σ1
+
|σ21 − σ22 |+ 1
σ21
,
|µ1 − µ2|
σ2
+
|σ21 − σ22 |+ 1
σ22
}
.
Denoting J = {⌊kα⌋, . . . , ⌊k/2⌋ − 1}, we have that
µ1 − µ2 =
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
E [Xi]−
∑
i∈M∗
1
(k)
E [Yi] =
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I∗
j
(E [Xi]− E [Yi]) =
∑
j∈J
ζj .
σ21 =
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Xi] =
∑
j∈J
(
nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
+
(
1− 2j
k
) nj∑
i=1
δji −
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
)
≥
∑
j∈J
(
nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
− nj 1
k2
)
≥
∑
j∈J
nj
k2
(j (k − j)− 1) .
Similarly
σ22 =
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Yi] =
∑
j∈J
(
nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
)
+mj
1
k
(
1− 2j + 1
k
))
≥
∑
j∈J
(
nj
j
k
(
1− j
k
))
≥
∑
j∈J
nj
k2
j (k − j)
≥
∑
j∈J
nj
k2
(j (k − j)− 1) .
Finally,
σ21 − σ22 =
∑
j∈J

∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Xi]−
∑
i∈I∗
j
Var[Yi]

 =∑
j∈J
((
1− 2j
k
)
ζj +
(
mj
1
k2
−
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
))
,
where observe that σ21 − σ22 ≥ 0, since(
1− 2j
k
)
ζj +
(
mj
1
k2
−
nj∑
i=1
(δji )
2
)
≥
(
1− 2j
k
)
ζj +
(
mj
1
k2
− 1
k
nj∑
i=1
δji
)
=
(
1− 2j
k
)
ζj − 1
k
ζj =
=
(
1− 2j + 1
k
)
ζj ≥ 0.
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We proceed to bound each of the terms |µ1−µ2|σ1 ,
|σ21−σ
2
2 |+1
σ2
1
,
|µ1−µ2|
σ2
and |σ
2
1−σ
2
2|+1
σ2
2
separately. We have
|µ1 − µ2|
σ1
=
µ1 − µ2
σ1
≤
∑
j∈J ζj√∑
j∈J
nj
k2 (j (k − j)− 1)
≤ k
∑
j∈J ζj√∑
j∈J:nj≥1
(j (k − j)− 1)
≤ Z√∑
j∈J:nj≥1
(j (k − j)− 1)
where Z = |{j ∈ J |nj ≥ 1}|
=
1√∑
j∈J:nj≥1
(
j(k−j)−1
Z2
)
≤ 1√∑⌊kα⌋+Z−1
j=⌊kα⌋
(
j(k−j)−1
Z2
)
≤ 1√
min1≤Z≤k/2−⌊kα⌋
{∑⌊kα⌋+Z−1
j=⌊kα⌋
(
j(k−j)−1
Z2
)} .
Note that
j2+Z−1∑
j=j1
(j (k − j)− 1) = 1
6
Z(−7− 6j21 + 6j1(1 + k − Z) + 3k(−1 + Z) + 3Z − 2Z2). (4)
For j1 = ⌊kα⌋, let us define
F (Z) :=
1
Z2
j2+Z−1∑
j=j1
(j (k − j)− 1) ≡ 1
6Z
(−7− 6j21 + 6j1(1 + k − Z) + 3k(−1 + Z) + 3Z − 2Z2)
The derivative of F is
F ′(Z) =
7 + 6j21 + 3k − 6j1(1 + k)− 2Z2
6Z2
=
7 + 6⌊kα⌋2 + 3k − 6⌊kα⌋(1 + k)− 2Z2
6Z2
< 0, for large enough k.
Hence F is decreasing in [1, k/2− ⌊kα⌋] so it achieves its minimum at Z = k/2− ⌊kα⌋. The minimum itself is
F (k/2− ⌊kα⌋) = −14 + 6⌊k
α⌋ − 4⌊kα⌋2 − 3k + 4⌊kα⌋k + 2k2
6k − 12⌊kα⌋ = Ω(k).
Hence,
|µ1 − µ2|
σ1
= O(k−1/2).
Similarly, we get
|µ1 − µ2|
σ2
= O(k−1/2).
It remains to bound the terms |σ
2
1−σ
2
2 |+1
σ2
1
and |σ
2
1−σ
2
2 |+1
σ2
2
. We have
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|σ21 − σ22 |+ 1
σ21
≤ 1 +
∑
j∈J (ζj +mj
1
k2 )∑
j∈J
nj
k2 (j (k − j)− 1)
≤ 1 + k
∑
j∈J (kζj) +M∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
(where M :=
∑
j
mj)
≤ 1 + kZ +M∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
(where Z = |{j ∈ J |nj ≥ 1}|)
=
kZ∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
+
1 +M∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
The second term of the above expression is bounded as follows
1 +M∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
≤ 1∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
+
M∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
≤ 1∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
+
M∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
≤ 1⌊kα⌋(k − ⌊kα⌋)− 1 +
1∑
j∈J
mj
M (⌊kα⌋(k − ⌊kα⌋)− 1)
≤ 2⌊kα⌋(k − ⌊kα⌋)− 1 = O(k
−1−α).
The first term is bounded as follows
kZ∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
≤ kZ∑
j∈J:nj≥1
(j (k − j)− 1)
≤ 1∑⌊kα⌋+Z−1
j=⌊kα⌋
(
j(k−j)−1
kZ
)
≤ 1
min1≤Z≤k/2−⌊kα⌋
{∑⌊kα⌋+Z−1
j=⌊kα⌋
(
j(k−j)−1
kZ
)} .
From above
j2+Z−1∑
j=j1
(j (k − j)− 1) = 1
6
Z(−7− 6j21 + 6j1(1 + k − Z) + 3k(−1 + Z) + 3Z − 2Z2). (5)
For j1 = ⌊kα⌋, let us define
G(Z) :=
1
Zk
j2+Z−1∑
j=j1
(j (k − j)− 1) ≡ 1
6k
(−7− 6j21 + 6j1(1 + k − Z) + 3k(−1 + Z) + 3Z − 2Z2)
The derivative of G is
G′(Z) =
3− 6j1 + 3k − 4Z
6k
=
3− 6⌊kα⌋+ 3k − 4Z
6k
> 0, for large enough k since Z ≤ k/2.
Hence G is increasing in [1, k/2− ⌊kα⌋] so it achieves its minimum at Z = 1. The minimum itself is
G(1) =
−6− 6⌊kα⌋2 + 6⌊kα⌋k
6k
= Ω(kα).
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Hence,
kZ∑
j∈J nj (j (k − j)− 1)
= O(k−α),
which together with the above implies
|σ21 − σ22 |+ 1
σ21
= O(k−α)
Similarly, we get
|σ21 − σ22 |+ 1
σ22
= O(k−α).
Putting everything together we get that∣∣∣∣TP (µ1, σ21)− TP (µ2, σ22)∣∣∣∣ ≤ O(k−α) +O(k−1/2).

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